reduction in funds for the Cancer Program. I am convinced that the funds currently being made available are badly needed and essential. However, I also believe that the other institutes of NIH have been dangerously underfunded over the past eight years, and I would hope in particular that the National Institute for General Medical Sciences, which is by far the best and most appropriate source for the support of basic, undifferentiated biomedical science, can be very greatly strengthened.
In the meanwhile, however, it ought to be a lucky thing, for medicine and biology both, that the problem of cancer is itself the broadest of all problems in biological science. It ought to be a lucky thing, since it will probably be impossible for cancer to be explained in any real depth without exploring fields which represent virtually every field of biology. Moreover, the problem of human cancer brushes against disease mechanisms which may underlie a wide variety of other, seemingly unrelated diseases-for example, rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, the "slow virus" diseases, certain genetic disorders of early life, the so-called autoimmune diseases. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate that funds earmarked for cancer research should be deployed for high-merit projects in other institutes of NIH, especially the Institute for General Medical Sciences, for as long as other funds for such projects are not available. The planning of science for cancer ought to include careful plans for sharing and collaboration with the other institutes, not as a measure for bailing out impoverished programs but as a rational, sensible, entirely self-interested way of finding out more about cancer itself.
And now, if I may, I would like to move beyond the cancer problem and consider some much more general aspects of the planning of science, science in general, biological science in particular, and science for the long-term future.
If there are, as is sometimes claimed, certain matters that human beings are better off for not knowing about, or things that we ought not be trying to understand, I cannot imagine what these might be. Therefore I do not propose to get into this line of argument beyond acknowledging that the argument does exist. I take it as axiomatic that science is a useful, intelligent and productive sort of human behavior, and, as our collective social activities go, it has a considerably better record than most. Moreover, I doubt that it will make a great deal of difference, in the very long run, whether any or even all of us were to decide that science was, for one reason or another, a bad thing and should be voted away. It is now a permanently established part of our social structure, and it will not go away. To be sure, it has only become a dominant part of human behavior during the last 300 years or so, but it represents an explosively successful expression of the most fundamental of all human urges, which is to find out about things. We seem to have agreed, informally, a few centuries ago, that we were not likely ever to find all the meaning we need by making it up out of our own heads, so we set about doing science, and I believe we will keep at it, for a long time to come. I believe that science is a good thing for the human mind, and as important for the development of collective human thought as any of the other forms of art that seek for meaning. I don't think its influence has yet penetrated the inner layers of our consciousness to the extent that literature has, or painting, or music, but perhaps this is because science is still only at its beginning. I cannot imagine any terminal point in its future, nor any line of inquiry that will prove inaccessible.
I am aware of the dangers of hubris in this line of thinking. We do run certain risks, especially in biological science, and all of us are aware of them. The new technology that permits the stitching together of DNA from different sources, bacterial, viral, even human, and the possible hazards to life posed by such man-made micromonsters, have sent a chill through the microbiological community, but by and large the people who work in this field are properly cautious and apprehensive, as are the people who support the laboratories concerned, and I am confident that these hybrids will be handled with appropriate respect. Incidentally, hubris is a peculiarly appropriate and perhaps prophetic word here, since it is etymologically the same word as hybrid. Hubris and hybrid were constructed in Greek from two Indoeuropean roots signifying outrage. Hybrid was originally used to describe the fantastically undesirable offspring of the wild boar and the domestic sow. Like many of our oldest words, it carries its own warning inside.
There are, of course, other kinds of hazards ahead. The press has caught sight of some of these, and we are entering what I hope will be a temporary phase in which science is considered too risky for words. Along with oil spills, strip-mining and herbicidal warfare, for which science gets blamed, we are also suspected of making plans to clone eminent politicians, or transplant heads, or devise drugs to control human behavior to our personal liking. People are becoming fearful of science, and I would too if I thought such things were likely to happen. Which I do not.
Set against the possible hazards of new and better science are the self-evident benefits. There are three general categories of benefit, which I would list in the order of their importance to humanity as follows: First, a more comprehensive understanding of nature, and a consequent enrichment of the human spirit. Second, more information which can be used to solve major human problems in the future, especially problems relating to human disease. Third, a kind of information that can be put to use directly, the minute it is obtained, for practical and beneficial purposes.
The first category, that of understanding and meaning, I do not propose to deal with further in this talk. Although it ranks at the top of my list (or perhaps because it is there) I could not possibly deal with it and have time to discuss the other two. And it is the other two about which most of us are deeply worried today, and with which society's decisions about the planning of science are most directly concerned.
I intend to talk about the difference between basic and applied science, for this is actually the center of today's argument. It is a particularly agitated argument in the biomedical sciences, and this year-and I expect for some years to come-it is also, separately, an argument about how science should be carried out in the problem of cancer.
The great trouble with talking about basic and applied science is that people think you are arranging scientists into social castes, with differing and antagonistic customs and manners. The terms have become loaded, with bogus meanings. Basic scientists are always pictured as sunk in profundities, thinking every inch of the way, fishing up obscure bits of information for which there can be no conceivable use, and ill-paid for their infinite pains. Applied scientists are well-off, athletic chaps, using other people's research to manufacture things that can be sold at a profit, superficial, unmeditative. Clinical scientists, a term which includes anyone working on human disease mechanisms these days, are caught somewhere in the middle, often labelled as applied scientists when they are engaged in perfectly straightforward basic research, and then rebuked for not emerging promptly with marketable products.
Because of metaphors like these, the terms basic and applied have lost much of their usefulness, and when they come into general conversation they tend to cause more trouble than they seem worth. Nevertheless, I would like to use them for this discussion, on condition that I can make them mean exactly what I want them to mean. The terms can be very useful if you are going to consider the planning of science, and most especially the funding of science whether by government or foundations or universities or research institutes. They are, in fact, two entirely different kinds of scientific effort, and it is perfectly fair to call one basic and the other applied if you're scrupulously fair-minded about what the terms signify. Unless you manage to keep them separate in your mind, and plan for them as quite different kinds of activity, you run the danger of ending up without any good science at all.
Applied science, then, according to my definition, is the kind of scientific activity that you must engage in when you are almost entirely certain how an experiment, or a chain of experiments, is going to turn out. The potential usefulness or profitability of the outcome has nothing to do with the matter; the outcome could simply be entertaining or philosophically illuminating, and it would still be applied science if you start out with a very high degree of certainty. To become engaged in this kind of work, you have to start out with an orderly and abundant array of indisputable facts, better still a redundant array, and these facts inform you that the outcome is not just a possibility, or even a probability, but nearly a dead certainty.
There are several outstanding examples of this sort of applied science in biology. The Salk vaccine is a particularly instructive one. The indisputable facts at hand, many of them provided by basic scientists working with Paul and Horstmann here at Yale, were that there were three types of polio virus, and no more, that all three were good antigens, and that they could be provided in infinite quantities by Enders' tissue culture techniques. Once these things were known it was an absolute certainty that a vaccine against poliomyelitis could be made for human use. This was not to suggest that the work would be easy, or undemanding of high immunologic skill, or any less rigorous and sophisticated than any other set of experiments in biomedical science. Just that it was a certainty, and the work that was then performed by Salk and his associates was a masterpeice of elegant applied science. But it had to be organized and controlled in a quite different way from the preceding basic research.
The development in the past several years of better and constantly more effective chemotherapy against acute childhood leukemia is another example. It became a certainty, or a near-certainty, that if the right combinations of certain drugs could be worked out, affecting different points in the cell cycle, and if their administration could be timed and monitored correctly, the disease could be cured in more children, and the rate of sustained remissions rose from under 20% to a substantially higher figure, now well over 50%. The work required meticulous attention and great caution, involving a large number of skilled investigators, and it turned out as had been predicted by the most knowledgeable people in the field. Something like this has also happened in the therapy of Hodgkins disease and certain other lymphomas, and most spectacularly in a number of the solid cancers of childhood.
In some respects, this kind of applied research resembles the moon-shot, or the proximity fuse, or the hydrogen bomb, and it is fair enough to draw analogies between the planning of biomedical and physical science when you are working at this level. You obviously need a high degree of organization. Management skills are indispensable in both the planning and the doing of the science. The logic of systems analysis may be invaluable. All of the scientists involved are under an obligation to work together in team-fashion, and everyone must stick closely to an agreed schedule.
It is a distinguishing characteristic of any really great piece of applied science that if it doesn't turn out the way it is supposed to, the people engaged in the work are surprised and dismayed. Something really quite awful must have gone wrong.
In basic science, everything is precisely the opposite. The shock, and the surprise, Now, you do need skilled, hardworking committees to arrange the doing of applied science, and the success of the outcome may very well depend on the quality of committee planning. On the other hand, committees, even small committees composed of the brainiest people in town, can be the death of basic science. Not always, of course; once in a while it happens that a committee member will cry out in anguish because a new idea has just fought its way up into his consciousness, but the chances are statistically better, in my opinion, that the idea would have come sooner and with greater clarity if he'd been away from the committee, stumbling down the corridor, or staring out of his laboratory window, or maybe shaving.
The really good ideas, the sudden intuitive perceptions of connections between seemingly unrelated bits of information, the sudden overwhelming revelations that make a scientist worry seriously about what would happen to the fate of the world if he were hit by a truck on his way to work, occur in individual minds, and they cannot be programmed or planned. If I am right about these things, then the most important and difficult step in the planning of science is to decide where the problem stands on the issue of certainty. If you have lots of good hard facts, all pointing plainly to a predictable outcome, it makes no difference how difficult the technological steps or how sophisticated the instruments required; if you line up the investigators in the right order and lay out the work in a properly systematic fashion, you get what you want, sooner or later. But if you make a mistake at the outset in your evaluation of the certainty of the position, and if what you are really needing are good hunches and flashes of intuition, it will be a disaster. If you try to organize basic uncertainty science in this manner you'll get nothing out of it except more uncertainty in an endless, impenetrable series of committee reports, all equally depressed and depressing.
I have a strong hunch that most of the important and interesting questions in biomedical science today, including the problem of cancer, are intrinsically matters of high uncertainty. There is an abundance of new and fascinating information, and there are a good many enticing theories concerning the key issues of etiology, the fundamental mechanisms underlying neoplastic transformation, the possible role of immunologic reactants, the nature of viral transformation, and even new approaches to chemical control of neoplastic cells. But, despite the richness of the new information, and the increasing speed with which it is being accumulated, I do not sense any general feeling of certainty at this time about any fundamental aspect of the cancer problem. It seems to me a completely safe prediction that if and when the time comes when there is a general and comprehensive answer to the problem of cancer, this will be an event of overwhelming surprise; indeed, I'd go so far as to predict that the first reaction of most of us in this room will be "But that is impossible!" Needless to say, the almost immediate second reaction in some quarters may be "Ah yes, that is really what my group has been saying for some time," but the very first response will be dumfoundment. And how do we make plans for that? Meanwhile, there are important parts of the problem that lend themselves nicely to the most exacting methods of applied science right now, and there will be more of these in the years just ahead, if we are lucky. We need to develop better techniques of assessment so that these can be recognized quickly, and capitalized on-like the childhood leukemia story, for example. But there are not many, not yet, and we must not make the mistake of trying to force them into existence before their time.
A similar situation exists for most of the other major human diseases. There is a limited number of problems where certainty has already led to major achievements in applied science; the outstanding example is, I suppose, the development of the whole field of antibiotic therapy for bacterial infections. For the most part, however, we are in unknown territory, engaged in a running hunt, and we will have to rely on the same chaotic, disorderly, spontaneous, unmanageable and uncontrollable manifestations of the human intellect that have brought the natural sciences to their present stature over the last couple of hundred years.
Come to think of it, even though it isn't yet clear just how it worked, it hasn't worked out all that badly, you know. We stumbled our way into chemistry and evolution, quantum mechanics and relativity turned up, genetics evolved with a life of its own, microbiology blundered its way along from 1875 into the era of antibiotics, and here today, all unplanned for and unpredicted, are molecular biology, immunology, neurophysiology and, who knows, experimental psychology. I cannot believe that any committee, no matter how bright, could have sat down 40 years ago, when I was a medical student, and laid plans in anticipation of today's biological science.
We owe an enormous debt to the past, but we have an even harder obligation to the future. We must concede that the future exists, and that there is a tremendous amount of highly important work to be done which we will never know anything about, and cannot even guess at today. This requires of us more humility than we are accustomed to display, and we must dig deep to find it.
So far, the whole enterprise has been a reasonable success. We are entitled to celebrate the body of science as one of the greatest of all human accomplishments, and we can do this without any risk of seeming to boast, provided we make it clear that we are describing the whole science, and all its history. Where we get ourselves into deep trouble is by seeming to claim that science is something we just invented around say, two decades ago, and, having invented it, we're about to figure out some really neat ways of doing it better and quicker. We didn't invent it, and we haven't really discovered yet any qualitatively different ways of doing it, and we certainly can't claim to understand how the system works. The best we can do, if we want to improve it, is to continue reminding ourselves of the principal features of the scientific structure that we have inherited from our forebears. It is a legacy passed straight down from the longer, more ancient tradition of scholarship, and it includes honesty, the endlessly rewarding and uniquely human gratification that comes with the opportunity to tell someone else everything you know about something new and important, the pleasure that comes from surprise, and certain congenial habits of work: these include meticulousness, self-criticism, skepticism, an obsession with making notes and references to the work of predecessors; in short, rigor. With these and the odd surfacing of genius, and all without any master-planning in advance, we obtained, long ago, Faraday, Maxwell, Gibbs, Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg, Pasteur, Ehrlich, Metchnikoff, and a tremendous list of today's luminaries too long to mention, and heaven knows who tomorrow. With so many other things in doubt, it is comforting to know that the tradition is so old and so powerful, and so spectacularly lucky, and that, whatever today's weather, it is certainly here to stay.
Lewis 
